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Abstract: 
Defamation law has traditionally occupied a position of overwhelming dominance in the vindication 
of the right to reputation. Nevertheless, liberalization of this legal framework including through the 
Defamation Act 2013 has led to a concern that, when analysed from a fundamental rights perspective, 
“gaps” in the protection provided for natural persons may have emerged. In this new context, there 
has been a renewed focus on whether data protection may fill the potential lacunae. Data protection 
law contains a number of important limitations and exceptions and its jurisprudence has been both 
limited and sometimes confused. Nevertheless, this article argues that its broad purpose and complex 
structure ensure it will play a significantly augmented role in the future, especially in actions against 
website operators facilitating the dissemination of information posted by a third party, the publication 
of opinion or where either injunctive relief or the correction of inaccurate information is sought (in 
particular in cases of continuing online disclosure). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a widespread belief that London is the “libel capital of the world” and that both European and 
American defamation laws afford “better protection for media defendants”.1  Nevertheless, for over a 
decade, English defamation law has been evolving in a more free speech friendly direction.  The 
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of Cambridge.  I would like particularly to thank Gavin Phillipson for this comments on research related to this 
article.  All errors and opinions remain my own. 
1 G. Robertson and A. Nicol, Media Law (London 2007), 93. 
                                                          
Defamation Act 2013 not only consolidates that shift but furthers it considerably, thereby heightening 
concerns that gaps in the proper protection of natural persons” rights to reputation may have emerged.  
In this changing context, it is important to explore whether such claimants might increasingly rely 
successfully on data protection in order to vindicate this right.  As will be seen, the broad purposes of 
this statutory scheme together with its complex structure mean that such Claimants could seek to hang 
their argument on any one of a number of its provisions.  Recourse to data protection law may be 
particularly enticing due to the fact that, over the very same time that defamation law has been 
liberalizing, it has generally become more onerous.    Both the broad scope and potential onerous 
depth of data protection was recently highlighted by the seminal Court of Justice of the EU judgment 
of Google Spain which found that search engines had significant and ongoing responsibilities when 
indexing material from the public web.2  Nevertheless, it remains true that data protection law in the 
United Kingdom contains numerous limitations and exemptions which seek to constrain its effect.  
Moreover, national jurisprudence on data protection is both limited and sometimes confused.  In spite 
of this, it is the central argument of this article that data protection law will assume significantly 
greater importance in vindicating reputation over the coming years, especially in actions against 
website operators facilitating the dissemination of information posted by a third party, those involving 
the publication of opinion or where either injunctive relief or the correction of inaccurate information 
is sought (in particular in cases of continuing online disclosure). 
The article is structured into five sections.  Following this brief introduction, section two 
explores both the fundamental concepts and historic contours of the law in this area.  Section three 
then outlines the changes to defamation law made by the Defamation Act 2013 together with relevant 
developments within data protection, which largely arise from recent case law and changes in 
regulatory approach.  This leads to section four which directly considers the way in which data 
protection might assume a greater role in vindicating the right to reputation in the future.  Lastly, the 
final section draws the strands of the argument and offers some conclusions. 
2 C-131/12 Google Spain, Google Inc. v.  Agencia Espaňola de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja 
González, Judgment of 13 May 2014, not yet reported. 
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 II. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND LAW 
This article explores the role of two sets of laws – defamation and data protection – in protecting an 
individual’s “right to reputation” from publication which may violate it.  Given this, it is important at 
the outset to explore in some detail the meaning and import of both the “right to reputation” and the 
right to freedom of expression which is in inevitable tension with it.   Following this outline, the 
section then elucidates the historic purpose and contours of both defamation and data protection law.  
Finally, brief mention is made of the tort of malicious falsehood. 
 
A. The “Right to Reputation” and Freedom of Expression  
Reputation is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “[t]he general opinion or estimate of a 
person’s character or other qualities; the relative esteem in which a person or thing is held”.  Within 
the Western tradition, there is a long-standing and strong consensus that both reputation, and the right 
to it, are of foundational importance.  Thus, Solove argues that 
[o]ur reputation is one of our most cherished assets … Our reputation is an essential component of 
our freedom, for without the good opinion of our community, our freedom can become empty … 
Our reputation can be a key dimension of our self, something that affects the very core of our 
identity.  Beyond its internal influence on our self-conception, our reputation affects our ability to 
engage in basic activities in society.  We depend upon others to engage in transactions with us, to 
employ us, to befriend us, and to listen to us.3 
In support of these arguments and assertions, Solove cites Shakespeare, Arthur Miller, President John 
Adams and the sociologist C. F. Cooley. 
3 D. J. Solove, The Future of Reputation (New Haven, Conn., 2007), 30 - 31. 
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Notwithstanding the centrality of the right to reputation, its precise scope remains ambiguous.  
Firstly, it is unclear whether reputation only covers the dissemination of statements which either 
directly or by necessary implication reflect on a person’s esteem.  Secondly, to the extent that its 
ambit is so restricted, the standards by which such an evaluation is made must be determined.  At one 
extreme, statements interfere with reputation even if a person’s esteem is only negatively affected in 
the eyes of just one individual   Many, however, reject such an interpretation fearing that allowing for 
“a search for the few idiosyncratic individuals who would think less of the plaintiff for conduct that 
the overwhelming majority would find laudatory” would open the door to “chaotic individualism”. 4  
Jurisdictions, therefore, generally seek to restrict the situations in which such a right can be invoked.  
Indeed, rather at the other extreme, Claimants may have to demonstrate that the “right-thinking 
member of society generally”5 would consider that the statement in question would reflect negatively 
upon them.  Between these two poles, some jurisdictions require only that a ‘substantial and 
respectable minority” of society would hold such an opinion.6  Yet introduction of any such 
qualification poses difficult practical and theoretical challenges.   Practically, published statements 
that, say, a person is a police informant or homosexual7 may cause that individual considerable 
distress or even pecuniary damage.  However, at least in 2013, it is not clear that any such statements 
would be actionable under the latter two standards detailed above.  Moreover, at a theoretical level, it 
may be argued that the notion of a societal or communal consensus regarding estimation is a “myth” 
which often allows judges, even if unconsciously, to impose their values on the situation.8   
 One historic consensus within the English tradition, however, is that the right to reputation 
cannot restrict the distribution of accurate, even if negative, statements about an individual.  As 
Rodgers notes, the law takes the view that “if people think the worse of [the Claimant] when they hear 
the truth about him that merely shows that his reputation has been reduced to its proper level”.9  
4 L. B. Lidsky, “Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community” (1996) 71(1) Washington L Rev, 19 and 
20. 
5 Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All E.R. 1237 (HL). 
6 Lidsky (n 4), 7.  
7 ibid, passim. 
8 ibid, passim. 
9 W. V. H. Rodgers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (London 2010), 601.  
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Nevertheless, and importantly, particular laws may differ as to whether they place on claimants a 
requirement to prove any such inaccuracy or whether, absent sufficient contrary evidence, this is 
simply presumed.  Moreover, statements of opinion may also be published which, although clearly 
impacting on reputation, are intrinsically incapable of being either accurate or inaccurate.  An 
example would be asserting that somebody is a “depraved” individual.  In such cases, criteria other 
than truth or falsity must be used to determine the statement’s legality.   
Irrespective of whether the statements in question are ones of opinion or alleged fact, there is also 
a consensus that the right to reputation is in necessary and fundamental tension with the right to 
“receive and impart information and ideas”,10 a key aspect of another central value within Western 
society, namely, freedom of expression.  A reconciliation between these values is, therefore, 
necessary.  Lord Steyn provides a useful summary of the various rationales for according freedom of 
expression strong weight: 
Freedom of expression is, of course, intrinsically important:  it is valued for its own sake.  But it is 
well recognised that it is also instrumentally important.  It serves a number of broad objectives.  
Firstly, it promotes the self-fulfilment of individuals in society.  Secondly, in the famous words of 
Holmes J. (echoing John Stuart Mill), “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market” … Thirdly, freedom of speech is the lifeblood of 
democracy.  The free flow of information and ideas informs political debate.  It is a safety value:  
people are more ready to accept decisions that go against them if they can in principle seek to 
influence them.  It acts as a brake on the abuse of power by public officials.  It facilitates the 
exposure of errors in the governance and administration of justice of the country.11 
The seminal importance of freedom of expression is recognised in the fact that it is set out as a 
stand-alone fundamental right within both the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)12 and 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.13  At the same time, in cases where “an attack on a person’s 
10 ECHR (ETS No. 5), Article 10. 
11 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 A. C. 115, 126. 
12 ibid. 
13 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ 2010 C 83, p. 389), Article 11. 
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reputation” attains “a certain level of seriousness and in a manner causing prejudice to personal 
enjoyment of a right to respect for private life”,14  the right to reputation is also recognised as falling 
within another right protected by both these instruments, namely the fundamental right to respect for 
private and family life.  Additionally, as will be explicated below, the right to reputation of natural 
persons will generally fall within the right to the protection of personal data, which is recognised as a 
discrete fundamental right within the EU Charter15 (but not the ECHR).   When such fundamental 
rights are at stake, it that recognised that the courts must accord each right “equal respect”16 and seek 
to strike a “fair balance”17 between them in the concrete situation.  In interpreting the law, courts 
should have recourse to an “ultimate balancing test” involving “an intense focus on the comparative 
importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case” coupled with a taking into 
account of “the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right”.18 
 
B. Defamation 
Defamation law has long enjoyed a position of clear dominance in the vindication of the right to 
reputation.  This is reflective not only of its historical pedigree – it can traced back to the eleventh 
century within English law19 – but also to the fact that it has traditionally afforded “greater weight to 
the rights of the claimant at the expense of those of the defendant”.20   Historically, this law has 
provided protection against any publication of a statement which has a tendency to have an adverse 
effect on reputation.  Publication here is defined broadly as any dissemination to a person other than 
14 Axel Springer v Germany (Application no. 39954/28) (2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 6. 
15 Article 8, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
16 Axel Springer, para. 84. 
17 Axel Springer, para. 87. 
18 S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication), Re [2004] UKHL 47; [2005] 1 A.C. 593 at [17] (per 
Lord Steyn).  For further analysis of this approach see H. Fenwick, “Judicial Reasoning in Clashing Rights 
Cases” in H. Fenwick, G. Phillipson & R. Masterman, Judicial Reasoning Under the UK Human Rights Act 
(Cambridge 2011), ch. 10. 
19 Robertson & Nicol (note 1), 95. 
20 K. Rimel, 2000, “A new public interest defence for the media?  The House of Lords” decision in Reynolds v 
Times Newspapers Ltd.” (2000) 11(2) Ent. L. R. 36, 36.  Whilst Rimel limited her evaluation to libel, it seems a 
fair analysis of the general nature of English defamation law prior to recent developments. 
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the claimant or one’s spouse.21  In contrast, reputation is defined relatively narrowly so as to protect 
only against statements which would “tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking 
members of society generally”22 or tend to lead members of society to shun or avoid him.23   Thus the 
Court of Appeal held in Byrne v Deane that to say, even if manifestly falsely, of a person that “he has 
reported certain acts, wrongful in law, to the police, cannot possibly be said to be defamatory of 
him”.24  On the other hand, the reputations of not only natural persons but also most artificial persons, 
including corporations, are covered.  The law is also based on a presumption that statements are false.  
Therefore, although the substantial accuracy of a statement constitutes a complete defence, defendants 
must prove this according to the ordinary civil standard.  Absent an appropriate defence, liability in 
defamation is strict.25  Moreover, at least when the statement is published in “permanent form”26 and 
therefore constitutes a libel, a “conclusive or irrebutable presumption of damage”27 traditionally 
applied.  Thus, defamation was generally actionable per se.   Finally, English defamation law has 
adopted a generous approach to assessment of damages providing not only compensation for actual 
damage to reputation and mental distress but also acknowledging that “in case the libel, driven 
underground, emerges from its lurking place at some future date, he [the Claimant] must be able to 
point to a sum…sufficient to convince a bystander of the baselessness of the charge”.28  Both 
aggravated and punitive damages may also be awarded.29  The generosity of defamation awards was 
also related to the fact that claimants in defamation actions were historically entitled to a jury trial 
“unless the court is of the opinion that the trial requires any prolonged examination of documents or 
accounts or any scientific or local investigation which cannot conveniently be made by a jury”.30  If a 
jury is appointed then it has the responsibility of setting any award of damages in the first instance. 
 Although much of the core of defamation is stringently formulated, the law also includes 
important limitations which have been widened over time.  The restrictive meaning given to the term 
21 Wennhak v Morgan (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 635 (HC). 
22 Sim v Stretch. 
23 Youssoupoff v MGN Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 T.L.R. 581 (CA). 
24 Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 K.B. 818 (CA), 833 per Slesser L. J. 
25 D. Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech (Oxford, 2008), 11. 
26 Broadcasting Act 1990, s. 116; Yousoupoff. 
27 Milo (note 25), 11. 
28 Cassell & Co. v Broome [1972] A.C. 1027 (HL), 1071 (per Lord Hailsham). 
29 ibid. 
30 Senior Courts Act 1981, s. 69. 
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reputation has already been noted.  Secondly, turning to the relief obtainable, under the rule in 
Bonnard v Perryman,31 the court is essentially prevented from granting an interim injunction so long 
as the defendant contends that a defence of the words will be mounted at the full hearing.  Moreover, 
even before the abolition of a right to jury trial in the Defamation Act 2013, Court of Appeal control 
of excessive jury awards has not only always been possible but such control had been strengthened as 
a result of both legislation and case law.32  Thirdly, legal aid has never been available in defamation 
actions.  Moreover, whilst introduction of Conditional Fee Arrangements (CFAs) in the 1990s did 
increase opportunities for individuals to pursue a remedy in defamation, there is increasing pressure to 
prevent the additional costs of these agreements (namely ‘success fees” and after-the-event insurance) 
being passed on to the losing side.33  Fourthly, in recognition of the potential “ʻchillingʼ effect” of its 
“rigorous, reputation protective principle”34, defamation law has long included a range of defences at 
both common law and in statute.  Some of these provide absolute protections such as when 
parliamentary35 or UK court proceedings36 are being reported.   Similarly, defendants are also free to 
disseminate opinions so long as these are based on facts which are both true and at least implicitly 
referred to, are held honestly and, prior to the Defamation Act 2013, involved a matter of “public 
interest”. 37  Both these latter concepts have been defined liberally.  Thus, an opinion will still be 
“honest” if it can be said that some honest or fair man “however exaggerated or obstinate his views” 
would have made the statement.38  Meanwhile “public interest” was interpreted as covering any 
matter which the public at large “may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at”.39 
Other defences to a defamation action are qualified in that they may be defeated by the 
claimant demonstrating that the defendant’s dominant purpose was to use a privileged occasion for an 
31 Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269 (CA). 
32 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s. 8, Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. (1986) [1993] 4 All E.R. 
QB (CA) [670] and John v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. 2 All E.R. 257 (CA). 
33 As regards most legal actions, the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 now 
generally prohibits such cost-shifting.  However, as a result of Conditional Fee Agreements Order SI 2013/689, 
the commencement of this reform in relation to both defamation and privacy proceedings has currently been 
stayed. 
34 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 192 (per Lord Nicholls). 
35 Broadly construed under the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840, s.1. 
36 Defamation Act 1996, s. 14. 
37 Joseph v Spiller [2010] UKSC 53; [2011] 1 A.C. 852. 
38 Turner v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd [1950] All ER 449 (HL) 461 (Lord Porter). 
39 London Artists v Littler [1969] 2 Q.B. 375 (CA) 391 per Lord Denning. 
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“indirect or improper motive”.40  Thus, under statute, defendants are empowered to freely disseminate 
a wide range of specified material subject to this safeguard.41  Moreover, under the common law, they 
also have a qualified right to convey information, even which turns out to be untrue, to anybody with 
an interest in receiving it so long as they also have a reciprocal moral, social or legal duty to provide 
such communication.   Most significantly, in Reynolds, the House of Lords modified this common law 
doctrine so as to also protect “responsible”42 journalistic publication in situations when “the public 
was entitled to know the particular information”.43  The court, however, stressed that such matters 
could only be assessed by having “regard to all the circumstances”,44 with Lord Nicholls providing a 
list of ten non-exhaustive, multi-factorial and illustrative indicia which might be taken into account in 
this regard.45   Reynolds’ “lack of hard edges in respect both of its reach and its effect”46 led to a 
rather uncertain legal landscape for the media.  Nevertheless, post-Reynolds “the obvious trend in the 
case law is towards a more liberal understanding of press freedom in the libel law context”.47  In 
particular, reversing both the High Court and the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords in Jameel 
stressed that ‘standard of conduct required” must be applied in a “practical and flexible manner”,48 
with weight generally being given to the “professional judgement” of the relevant editor or 
journalist.49  It was also clarified that the defence was not restricted to journalists but, rather, could be 
relied upon by “anyone who publishes material of public interest”.50  Finally, the Defamation Act 
1996 set out a special defence vis-à-vis the “innocent dissemination” of defamation material,51 which 
40 Clarke v Molyneux (1877) 3 Q.B.D. 237 (HC) 246. 
41 See Defamation Act 1952 and both Defamation Act 1996, pt 1 sch 1 (qualified privilege not subject to 
explanation or contradiction) and Defamation Act 1996, pt 2 sch 1(qualified privilege subject to allowing for 
explanation or contradiction by those persons referred to). 
42 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 A.C. 1270 (HL) at 202 (per Lord Nicholls). 
43 ibid, at 197 (per Lord Nicholls).  As Rimel (note 20) states, prior to this judgment, such privilege was “not 
recognised as applying to statements published by the media to the general public except, possibly, in cases of 
extreme emergency” (37). 
44 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd, 202. 
45 ibid, 205. 
46 I. Loveland “The ongoing evolution of Reynolds privilege in domestic libel law”, (2003) 14(7) Ent. L. R. 178, 
182. 
47 ibid. 
48 Jameel & Or v Wall Street Journal [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359 at para. [56] (per Lord Hoffmann). 
49 ibid at [33] (per Lord Bingham). 
50 ibid at [54] (per Lord Hoffmann).  See more specifically Charman v Orion Publishing Ltd. [2007] EWCA Civ 
97; [2008] 1 All E.R. 750; Seaga v Harper [2008] UKPC 9; [2009] 1 A.C. 1. 
51 This defence can be claimed by a range of secondary publishers including “the operator of … a 
communications system by means of which the statement is transmitted, or made available, by a person over 
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as a result of the EU e-Commerce Directive 2000, transposed into UK law by the Electronic 
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, was augmented by a general “intermediary” liability 
shield for storing information provided by a recipient of an information society service.52  In sum, 
within defamation law, the balance between the right to reputation and freedom of expression has 
significantly shifted in favour of the latter.  As will be seen below, this trend is continued in the 
Defamation Act 2013.  
 
C. Data Protection 
If assessing the contours of defamation law presents difficulties in light of the recent enactment of the 
wide-ranging Defamation Act 2013, then any analysis of data protection law poses even greater 
challenges.  These challenges stem not only from the complex interface between national and 
European law in this area but also, as Lord Justice Leveson recently noted, from the reality that “[t]o 
say that it [data protection] is little known or understood by the public, regarded as a regulatory 
inconvenience in the business world, and viewed as marginal and technical among practitioners 
(including our higher courts) … is perhaps not so far from the truth”.53  It nevertheless remains true 
that “the subject matter of the data protection regime… could hardly be more fundamental to issues of 
personal integrity, particularly in a world of ever accelerating information technology capability”.54 
In contrast to defamation law, data protection is of recent origin.  It emerged globally in the 
1970s from a belief that without a new system of regulation, the rise of new forms of information 
technology (notably computerised processing) would pose an unacceptable threat to the rights and 
whom he has no effective control”.  However, such publishers must demonstrate that “took reasonable care in 
relation to its publication to its publication” and “did not known, and had no reason to believe, that what he did 
caused or contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement”.51   In Godfrey v Demon Internet [2001] 
Q.B. 201 an Internet Service Provider (IPS) sought to rely on this defence in relation to the republication of an 
anonymous posting made on a United States-based newsgroup.  However, the defence was struck out on the 
basis that the defendant had not removed posting on notice and, therefore, had inter alia failed to reasonable 
care in relation to it. 
52 See Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2013).  This “hosting” shield only 
applies if upon obtaining knowledge of illegal activity or information, or even facts or circumstances from 
which such illegality is apparent, the provider “acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the 
information” (para. 19 (a) (ii)).  See also the related defences for mere conduit (para. 17) and caching (para. 18). 
53 B. Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (London 2012), 999. 
54 ibid. 
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interests of natural persons.  Whilst protecting privacy was a principal concern, it was far from the 
only value which seen to be under threat by these new developments.  Instead as the German Data 
Protection Act of 1977 stated, this law was to ensure against all “Mißbrauch” of personal data in order 
to “der Beeinträchtigung schutzwürdiger Belange der Betroffenen entgegenzuwirken”.55  The French 
Data Protection Act of the same year required that information technology “ne doit porter atteinte ni à 
l'identité humaine, ni aux droits de l'homme, ni à la vie privée, ni aux libertés individuelles ou 
publiques”.56  Rather more prosaically, the Council of Europe Convention on the subject finalised in 
1981 simply stated that its purpose was to secure for every individual “respect for his rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy”.57  The EU Data Protection Directive 
95/46, which was designed to “give substance to and amplify” the Convention’s provisions, 
essentially mirrored this objective referring specifically to the protection of “the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy”.58  Although the reference in 
both the Convention and the Directive to rights and freedoms may be thought to limit the purposive 
scope of these instruments, it should be stressed that these terms were construed extremely 
expansively.  Indeed, both the Convention’s Explanatory Report59 and the Directive60 text even refer 
to mere personal “interests” apparently synonymously with such “rights”.  Therefore, within its 
55 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG) 1977, s. 1 (1).  This is translated as ensuring against “misuse”, “to prevent 
harm to any personal interests that warrant protection”. See Gesellshaft fὔr Datzenschutz under Datensicherung, 
Law on the Protection Against the Misuse of Personal Data in Data Processing (Frankfurt am Main 1977). 
56 Loi no. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés, art. 1 (“must not 
undermine human identity, nor human rights, nor privacy, nor individual or public liberties” (own translation)). 
57 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data (ETS 108), Art. 1. 
58 Council Directive (EC) No. 95/46 (OJ 1995 L 281 p. 31), Recital 11.  Although the Council of Europe 
Convention remains in full force, it is the EU Directive which was assumed must the greater practical 
importance. 
59 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data (ETS 108) Explanatory Report, para. 25 (“[T]he unfettered exercise of the freedom to process 
information may, under certain conditions, adversely affect the enjoyment of other fundamental rights (for 
example privacy, non-discrimination, fair trial) or other legitimate personal interests (for example employment, 
consumer credit).  It is in order to maintain a just balance between the different rights and interests of 
individuals that the convention sets out certain conditions or restrictions with regard to the processing of 
information.  No other motives could justify the rules which the Contracting States undertake to apply in this 
field”). 
60 Council Directive (EC) No. 95/46, Recital 30 (stating that processing otherwise compatible with the Directive 
will be lawful so long as it carried “in the legitimate interests of the natural or legal person, providing that the 
interests or the rights and freedoms of the data subject are not overriding”).  Comparing the English language 
version of the Directive with that of the French and German, it is clear that, but for a typographical error, this 
same wording would be reflected in Art. 7 (f).  Instead, this article refers to the “interests for fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the data subject”. 
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material scope, data protection’s goals are certainly broad enough to encompass protecting a natural 
person’s right to reputation not simply through its incorporation either of the law of defamation or the 
right to respect for private and family life but, rather, directly.61  The autonomous nature of data 
protection is now reflected in the fact that it is protected as a separate fundamental right within the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.62 
Whilst the philosophical origin of data protection was rooted in lofty and wide-ranging human 
rights concerns, its subsequent spread was strongly related to concern that without harmonization of 
law in this area “trade would be fettered” as “information could not flow freely” between nations.63   
Thus, a number of countries drafted their data protection law principally out of a pragmatic concern to 
ensure compliance with transnational frameworks ensuring the free flow of data.  It was in this 
context that UK first passed a Data Protection Act in 1984 to implement the Council of Europe 
Convention and replaced this with the Data Protection 1998 when the EU Directive was transposed 
into municipal law.   As the quote from Leveson above indicates, the minimalist approach to data 
protection which this encouraged has generally been mirrored by our courts.  At the same time, it 
remains a fundamental principle that, as far as possible, national legislation must be interpreted so as 
to give full effect to binding EU legal requirements. 
 Turning to the material scope of data protection, both the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998 
and Data Protection Directive regulate the processing of data which is personal.  Although legal 
persons are clearly excluded, in other respects these terms are defined broadly.  Processing covers 
every activity performed on personal data including recording, holding, disclosing, destroying and so 
forth.64  Meanwhile, information will become data if it is processed on a digital device65 or even 
61 It should be noted that Data Protection Authorities (DPA) took an early interest in policing threats to such 
interests.  For example, even in the mid-1980s, the French DPA when assessing a new electronic messaging 
service stressed the dangers of “risque de diffusion messages anonymes injurieux ou portant atteinte à la 
réputation des personnes” Commission nationale de l”informatique et des libertés, 7e rapport d”activité  (Paris 
1986).   
62 Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 8. 
63 R. Jay, Data Protection Law and Practice (London 4th ed. 2012), 1. 
64 DPA, s. 1(1).  Cf. Data Protection Directive, art. 2 (b). 
65 Formally defined as “equipment operating automatically in response to instructions given for that purpose” 
(DPA, s. 1(1)). 
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within a structured manual filing system.66  Thus, all information, whether in the form of words, 
sounds or images, will be data if included on a computer, mobile phone or digital camera.  As the 
Court of Justice of the EU found in Criminal Proceedings against Lindqvist, even placing material on 
an unstructured internet page constitutes a processing of data.67  Meanwhile data will be personal so 
long as it “relate[s] to a living individual” who is directly identified or who is identifiable.68   This is 
wide enough to cover any information which is clearly about an individual, irrespective of whether 
this concerns private, professional or business life.69  Published information, arguably even if as 
seemingly anodyne as the name of author coupled with a book title,70 is also not excluded.  Any 
“expression of opinion” about the individual is also specifically included.71  Finally, it is the “data 
controller” who must generally ensure compliance with the data protection stipulations.  This is 
defined as any “person who (either alone or jointly or in common with other persons) determines the 
purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data are, or are to be processed.72  As a 
result of a specific exemption in both the EU e-Commerce Directive 200073 and the Electronic 
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002,74 such data controllers cannot make use of the general 
intermediary liability shield in order to absolve them from any of their responsibilities vis-à-vis the 
processing of personal data under the DPA. 
In substantive terms, all data controllers must generally ensure that processing complies with 
eight data protection principles75 which stipulate inter alia that personal data be processed “fairly”,76 
be “adequate, relevant and not excessive”,77 and be “accurate and, where necessary, kept up to 
66 Defined as one which is ‘structured, either by reference to individuals or by reference to criteria relating to 
individuals, in such a way that specific information relating to a particular individual is readily accessible” 
(DPA, s. 1(1)). 
67 C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings against Lindqvist [2003] ECR I-12971, [26]. 
68 DPA, s. 1(1). 
69 Jay (note 63), 171. 
70 “Amendments Likely on Data Protection”, Bookseller, July 5, 1991. 
71 DPA, s. 1(1). 
72 DPA, s. 1 (1). 
73 E-Commerce Directive, art. 1 (5) (b). 
74 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations SI 2002/2013, para. 3 (1) (b). 
75 DPA, pt 1, sch 1. 
76 DPA, para 1, pt 1, sch 1. 
77 DPA, para 3, pt. sch. 1. 
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date”.78  Inaccurate data is defined as that which is “incorrect or misleading as to any matter of fact”.79  
As an aspect of the fairness principle, the Act also requires that, as far as practicable, those who are 
the subject of the data must be notified of processing except where information was not collected 
from them directly and it is explicitly justified that such notification would constitute a 
“disproportionate effort”.80  Subjects are additionally given specific rights to access their data,81 stop 
processing which is causing or likely to cause unwarranted damage or distress82 and obtain 
compensation for breach of the Act in certain circumstances.83 Application may also be made for the 
rectification or erasure both of “inaccurate” data and data which contains “an expression of opinion 
which appears to the court to be based on the inaccurate data”.84  In the case of inaccurate data and 
even  in situations where this data has already been “rectified, blocked, erased or destroyed”, the court 
may further “order the data controller to notify third parties to whom the data have been disclosed” so 
long as it considers this “reasonably practicable”.85  In addition, a supervisory authority,86 the 
Information Commissioner, is established with wide-ranging powers to ensure compliance with the 
law including issuing enforcement notices requiring specific action of data controllers backed by 
criminal penalty87 and serving monetary penalty notices in relation to ‘serious” contraventions which 
are at least negligent in nature and are “of a kind likely to cause substantial damage or substantial 
distress”.88  Data subjects may appeal to the Information Commissioner and he has a duty to assess 
their case and consider what action, if any, should be taken.89 
 In line with its ambitious purposes, the DPA is clearly very expansive both in terms of scope 
and substantive subject matter.  Nevertheless, it also contains a number of important limitations and 
exemptions.  Firstly, as regards the requirement for accuracy, in significant contrast to defamation, not 
78 DPA, para 4, pt 1, sch 1. 
79 DPA, s. 70(2). 
80 DPA, paras 1-3, pt 2, sch 1 and Data Protection (Conditions Under Paragraph 3 of Part II of Schedule 1) 
Order, 2000, SI 2000/85. 
81 DPA, s. 7. 
82 DPA, s. 10. 
83 DPA, s. 13. 
84 DPA, s. 14(1). 
85 DPA, s. 13(3). 
86 Data Protection Directive, art. 28. 
87 DPA, s. 40. 
88 DPA, s. 55A. 
89 S. 42, DPA, s. 42. 
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only is there no presumption of inaccuracy, but Sch. 1 of the DPA also stipulates that this requirement 
will not be contravened so long as “the data controller has taken reasonable steps to ensure that 
accuracy of the data” and “if the data subject has notified the data controller of the data subject’s view 
that the data are inaccurate, the data indicate that fact”.90  Moreover, if seeking compensation, subjects 
must generally first prove “damage”.91  Proof of “distress” alone is only sufficient in relation to 
processing for the purposes of journalism, artistic purposes or literary purposes.92  Data controllers 
may additionally defend against such action by proving they have taken ‘such care as in all the 
circumstances was reasonably required to comply with the requirement concerned” .93  As regards the 
right to stop processing or to ensure the erasure or rectification of data,94 the courts are also formally 
granted discretion as to whether to award a remedy.  Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, where the 
processing is only for the purposes of journalism, artistic purposes and/or literary purposes, 
controllers need not comply with any of the substantive data protection principles so long as they 
reasonably believe both that publication would be in the “public interest” and that compliance with 
the provision or provisions in question would be “incompatible” with these purposes.95  The courts are 
also under a duty to stay proceedings until twenty four hours after publication has taken place in these 
cases96 and the Information Commissioner is somewhat restricted in the enforcement action that can 
be taken here.97  Finally, domestic processing by an individual solely for his or her “personal, family 
or household affairs (including recreational purposes)” is exempt from all data protection 
restrictions.98 
These significant limitations and exemptions have been augmented by the often reticent 
approach taken to data protection both by the English courts and indeed by the Information 
Commissioner.  In particular, the Court of Appeal in Durant v Financial Services Authority used 
references to privacy in the recitals of the Directive to attempt to restrict the DPA only to regulating 
90 DPA, para 7, pt 2, sch 1. 
91 DPA, s. 13(2)(b). 
92 DPA, s. 13(2)(b). 
93 DPA, s. 13(3). 
94 See DPA, s. 10(4) (right to stop processing) and s. 14(1) (right to erasure and rectification). 
95 DPA, s. 32. 
96 DPA, s. 32(4)(b). 
97 See DPA, s. 46. 
98 DPA, s. 36.  Cf. Data Protection Directive, art 3(2). 
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“information that affects [the data subject’s] privacy whether in his personal or family life, business or 
professional capacity”.99  This restrictive approach was echoed in the later case of Johnson v Medical 
Defence Union100  where Buxton L. J. also argued obiter that claimants would have to actively prove 
rather than rely on a presumption of damage to reputation in order to secure DPA compensation. This 
restrictiveness has been mirrored in the approach of the Information Commissioner.  In particular, as 
will be explored in subsequent chapters, the Commissioner has, at least until recently, proved very 
reluctant to respond to the publication of derogatory made by other individuals online.101 
 At the same time, however, the pan-European landscape has been much more forthright in its 
defence of the meaning and importance of data protection.  In the first place, the European Directive 
itself places no limitations at all on the general obligation to ensure data is processed fairly and 
accurately102 and that individuals have access to a judicial remedy for any breach of their rights.103  
Moreover, whilst Member States may derogate from these rights if such action is “necessary” to 
protect “the rights and freedoms of others”,104 it is unclear whether the over-arching limitations found 
within the DPA are sufficiently tailored to the defence of specific rights or freedoms so as to benefit 
from this provision.  After all, at the time of adoption of the Directive, the Council and Commission 
adopted a Statement for the Minutes stating unequivocally that “the derogation … does not refer to 
rights such as the right to carry out data processing”.105  In any case, the CJEU has consistently held 
that any exemption must comply with the “requirement of proportionality with respect to the public 
interest objective being pursued” and that the “national court must also interpret any provision of 
99 Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746; [2003] All E.R. (D) 124 (Dec), 28.  The ratio 
of the Durant case appears to have been side-lined by later case law even in the domestic context.  Thus, in the 
recent case of Edem v Information Commissioner, Financial Services Authority [2014] EWCA Civ 92, the Court 
of Appeal recently stated that all information which was “obviously about” an individual would be personal data 
(at [22]) and further found that even “[a] name is personal data unless it is so common that without further 
information … a person would remain unidentifiable despite its disclosure” (at [20]). 
100 [2007] EWCA Civ 262, 78; [2007] 3 CMLR 9 [76]. 
101 See Information Commissioner, Line to take - Dealing with complaints about information published online 
(2011) 
<www.ico.org.uk/about_us/how_we_comply/disclosure_log/~/media/documents/disclosure_log/IRQ0417298b.
ashx> accessed 19 August 2014. 
102 Data Protection Directive, art. 6. 
103 Data Protection Directive, art. 22. 
104 Data Protection Directive, art. 13(1)(g). 
105 Council of the European Union, Council Document 4730/95 (Annex I) (8 February 1995) (on file with the 
author). 
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national law, as far as possible, in light of the wording and the purpose of the applicable directive, in 
order to achieve the result pursued by the latter”.106  Even in relation to processing solely for the 
purposes of journalism, artistic purposes and/or literary purposes,107 the court has argued that 
exemptions may be provided “only in so far as strictly necessary”108 to achieve a balance between 
fundamental rights.  The CJEU has further held that the domestic processing exemption, which is 
absolute in nature, can only be relied upon in relation to “activities which are carried out in the course 
of private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the case with the processing of personal 
data consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are made accessible to an indefinite 
number of people”.109 
 
D. Malicious Falsehood 
Although this article is principally concerned with a comparison of defamation law with data 
protection law, it is necessary finally to note briefly the contours of malicious falsehood, a traditional 
cause of action which, although little used, is related to the protection of reputation.  This tort protects 
against dissemination of a statement to somebody other the claimant of information which is false.  
The information need not have any tendency to lessen respect for that person but, unlike in 
defamation, the claimant must prove the relevant falsity.110  In addition, the claimant must 
demonstrate actual, pecuniary damage or, alternatively, that the words either “are calculated to cause 
pecuniary damage to the plaintiff and are published in writing or other permanent form” or “are 
calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff in respect of any office, profession, calling, trade 
or business held or carried on by him at the of publication”.111  Finally, and most significantly, the 
claimant must prove “malice”.  In this context, this requires that the defendant either knew or was 
106 C-465/00 Rechnungshof v Österreichischer Rundfunk [2003] ECR I-4989, [91] and [93]. 
107 The subject of specifically permissive regulation under the Data Protection Directive, art 9. 
108 C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy [2008] ECR I-09831, 
[56]. 
109 Lindqvist, [47]. 
110 Robertson and Nicol (note 1), 113. 
111 Defamation Act 1952, s. 3(1). 
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reckless112 as to whether the statement was false113 or was actuated by some dishonest or improper 
motive.114  Negligence is not enough and an “[h]onest belief in an unfounded claim is not malice”.115  
These restrictions have severely circumscribed the ambit of this action.  Despite this, the tort remains 
relevant, not only because of its historic relationship with defamation, but also because as will be seen 
below it has been referred to in case law interpreting the requirements of data protection law.  
 
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN DEFAMATION AND DATA PROTECTION 
Both defamation and data protection law are in a state of flux.  On 1 January 2014 the Defamation Act 
2013 came into force.116  This Act effects a major reform of the law of defamation in England and 
Wales.117   While there are no live legislative proposals for the reform of data protection, there have 
been important developments in domestic and European case law as well as regulatory stance here.   
 
A. Defamation Act 2013 
The Defamation Act 2013 arose from the initiative of a law reform coalition concerned that the 
current law on defamation was unduly curtailing freedom of speech.118  The Act’s substantive reforms 
of relevance to this article are the introduction of a ‘serious harm” threshold,119 the crafting of new 
statutory defences of truth,120 honest opinion121 and publication on a matter of public interest122 and 
the introduction of various new defences to defamation, most notably that applicable to “website 
112 In other words, that the statement was made without caring whether it was true or false. 
113 Shapiro v La Mora [1923] All E.R. Rep 378. 
114 Dunlop v Maison Talbot (1904) 20 T.L.R. 579 (CA). 
115 Greers Ltd v Pearman & Corder Ltd (1922) 39 R.P.C. 406 (CA) 417. 
116 Defamation Act 2013 (Commencement) (England and Wales) Order 2013, SI 2013/3027. 
117 The Act has no application to Northern Ireland.  As regards Scotland, only ss. 6, 7(9), 15, 16(5) and 17 (3) 
apply.  These relate to the new defence for peer-reviewed statements in scientific or academic journals, a matter 
which has little relevance to the subject of this article.  See Defamation Act 2013, s. 17 (2)-(3). 
118 G. Phillipson, “The ʻglobal pariahʼ, the Defamation Bill and the Human Rights Act” (2012) 63 N.I.Q.L. 146. 
119 Defamation Act 2013, s. 1. 
120 Defamation Act 2013, s. 2 (replacing common law justification). 
121 Defamation Act 2013, s. 3 (replacing common law fair comment). 
122 Defamation Act 2013, s. 4 (replacing the common law Reynolds defence). 
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operators”.123  By crafting a new ‘single publication rule”124 the Act also makes an important 
procedural change to defamation law.  In addition, the right to a jury trial in defamation actions is 
abolished.125 
As the explanatory notes to the Act makes clear, the new statutory defences of truth and 
publication on a matter of public interest are largely codifications of the existing common law 
justification (truth) and “Reynolds” defences.126  However, the other changes are potentially much 
more significant.   Firstly, section one of the Act establishes that a publication will not be defamatory 
unless it has caused or is likely to cause ‘serious harm to the reputation of the claimant”.127   This 
stipulation reverses what has traditionally been seen as a cardinal principle of English law, namely 
that libel be actionable per se.128  It is true that the Court of Appeal in Jameel did strike out a 
defamation claim for abuse of process due to its failure to disclose a “real and substantial tort”,129 and 
also indicated that changes in the Civil Procedure Rules and the introduction of the HRA had rendered 
the court willing to take this, albeit still very rare, step more readily than in the past.130  Moreover, in 
Thornton v Telegraph Group Tugendhat J held that defamation law “must include a qualification or 
threshold of seriousness, so as to exclude trivial claims”.131  Nevertheless, Thornton remains a very 
recent decision at first instance132 and, overall, it is clear that this new section “raises the bar” for 
bringing a defamation claim in the future.133 
123 Defamation Act 2013, s. 5 (provision for a new defence to defamation action brought against operators of 
websites), s. 6 (qualified privilege in relation to peer-reviewed statements in scientific or academic journals) and 
s. 7 (provision for qualified or absolute privilege in relation to a range of either verbatim or summarised 
reports). 
124 Defamation Act 2013, s. 8. 
125 Defamation Act 2013, s. 11. 
126 As regards the latter, the wording that the defendant need only have “reasonably believed that publishing the 
statement complained of was in the public interest” (s. 4 (1) (b)) may be thought to have widened the defence by 
introducing a greater subjective element.   However, the Government (which proposed the wording) was clear 
that “the intention in this provision is [merely] to reflect the existing common law as most recently set out in 
Flood v Times Newspapers”.  See Ministry of Justice, Defamation Act 2013 Explanatory Notes (2013) 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/notes> accessed 10 April 2014. 
127 Defamation Act, s. 1. 
128 Milo (note 25), 11.  
129 Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] EWCA Civ 75, [2005] Q.B. 946, [70]. 
130 ibid, [55]. 
131 Thornton v Telegraph Group [2010] 1 W.L.R. 1986 [100]. 
132 Phillipson (note 118), 168.  
133 Ministry of Justice’s Explanatory Note (note 126), 3.   
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Secondly, turning to the clause dealing with “honest opinion”, many of the details of this new 
statutory defence merely consolidate the current common law defence of “fair comment” which it 
replaces.  Nevertheless, this restatement comes on the back of the Supreme Court’s expansive reading 
of this latter defence in Joseph v Spiller.134  There, the court found that the potential to defeat the 
defence by showing “malice” had been ‘significantly narrowed”.135   In particular, it was in no way 
relevant whether the defendant had been “motivated by spite or ill-will”.136  Rather, it was only 
necessary that the comment was honestly held, based on true facts which were indicated (even if only 
implicitly and in general terms) to the receiver of the message and finally was on a matter of “public 
interest”.    Whilst the court found that the scope of the latter requirement had been “greatly 
widened”,137 this last requirement nevertheless imparted a critical objective element into this defence.  
Importantly, however, the new statutory defence entirely removes this “public interest” 
requirement.138   As Phillipson noted during the lead-up to Bill’s enactment, this would appear to 
create a situation whereby the publication of “disparaging opinions on private life lacking a public 
interest would be lawful when the disclosure of the related private facts [at least when originally 
made] would not”.139   As an example, Phillipson suggests that free-ranging defamatory comment on 
Max Mosley’s German prison themed sado-masochistic sessions would be legal even though the 
disclosure of the facts on which the comment was based were published in breach of the tort of the 
misuse of private information.140 
Thirdly, the Act substantially broadens the range of defences to defamation action.  There is 
an extension of absolute privilege to fair, accurate and contemporaneous reporting of courts 
worldwide as well as a broad range of international courts and tribunals.141  Meanwhile, qualified 
privilege is extended to publication of fair and accurate copies, summaries or extracts of material 
134 Joseph v Spiller [2010] UKSC 53; [2011] 1 A.C. 852. 
135 ibid, [108]. 
136 ibid. 
137 ibid. 
138 The rewording also allows defamatory opinions related to facts which, though false, where “asserted to be a 
fact” on a certain privileged occasions (Defamation Act 2013, s. 3(4)(b)) including publication on a matter of 
public interest or of a peer-reviewed statement in a scientific or academic journal (ibid, s. 3(7)). 
139 Phillipson (note 118) 178. 
140 Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] E.M.L.R. 20. 
141 Defamation Act 2013, s. 7(1). 
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produced by any legislature or governmental body as well as reports of proceedings at a wide range of 
public meetings.142  A specific qualified privilege defence is also set out for the first time in relation to 
the publication of peer-reviewed statements in scientific or academic journals.143   By far the most 
significant new defence, however, is that provided to any “operator of a website in respect of a 
statement posted on the website”144 where it did not itself post the statement.   These entities have a 
complete shield from liability unless the claimant demonstrates that it was not possible for him to 
identify the person who did post the statement, the claimant gave the operator a notice of complaint 
and the operator failed to respond in accordance with the Defamation (Operators of Websites) 
Regulations 2013.145  Where the operator has no electronic means of contacting the poster, these 
regulations require that to benefit from the defence the operator remove the statement within 48 hours 
of receiving notice.146  In other situations, however, the operator only needs to notify the poster stating 
that the statement may be removed unless the operator receives a written response from the poster 
stating that he does not wish the statement to be removed and providing his full name and postal 
address.147  The operator has to remove the material from the website 48 hours after the end of the 
period in cases where the poster fails to respond148 or where the poster’s response is incomplete.149  
The latter does include situations where a “reasonable website operator would consider the name or 
postal address … to be obviously false”.150  However, in all other cases, the operator need only inform 
the complainant in writing within the same period that the poster does not wish the statement to be 
removed and that the statement has not been removed.151  So long as the poster has not consented to 
the release of his name and/or address, the operator must simply notify the complaint in writing of 
142 Defamation Act 2013, s. 7(4)-(9).  In order to benefit from these new defences, however, the publisher must 
satisfy either a “public interest” or “public benefit” test (see s. 7(2) read with s. 15(3)) and also ensure that if the 
subject of the statement so requests he publishes “in a suitable manner a reasonable letter or statement by way of 
explanation or contradiction” (s. 15(2)(a)). 
143 Defamation Act 2013, s. 6. 
144 Section 5 (1), Defamation Act 2013. 
145 SI 2013/3028. 
146 ibid, para. 3 (1). 
147 ibid, para. 2. 
148 ibid, para. 5. 
149 ibid, para. 6. 
150 ibid, para.6 (3). 
151 ibid, para. 8 (2) (i). 
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that fact.152  It will, therefore, be up to the complainant to apply for a court order for the possible 
release of this information.  Even if these details, once released, turn out to be false, no further 
liability will rest on the website operator.153  Thus, this new defence goes far beyond the “innocent 
dissemination” defence in the Defamation Act 1996 and the so-called intermediary liability shield 
under the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 noted above.154   Moreover, it is 
clear that the defence extends well beyond the kind of passive internet hosting protected by these 
latter Regulations.  Indeed, the Act provides on its face that the defence “is not defeated by reason 
only of the fact that the operator of the website moderates the statements posted on it by others”.155  
During the House of Commons proceedings, the Government stated that the clause was “intended to 
cover websites that directly host user-generated content” including “individuals or companies that run 
websites and exert influence over them”.  This definition was further held to a wide range of 
interactive and social media outlets including “website operators such as Facebook and Mumsnet, and 
online newspapers and bulletin boards that enable users to post and read messages”.156  Moreover, 
although this defence may technically be defeated if a claimant shows that the operator “had operated 
with malice in relation to the posting of the statement concerned”,157 the Government correctly 
emphasised that “it is difficult to foresee circumstances” in which a website operator otherwise 
complying with s. 5 “could do so maliciously”.158  Finally, it should be noted that, in addition to this 
defence, s. 10 also establishes that “[a] court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine an 
action for defamation brought against a person who was not the author, editor or publisher of the 
152 ibid, para. 8 (2) (ii). 
153 It should be noted that if a successful action is brought against the poster then the court is empowered to 
order the operator of the website to remove the statement (Defamation Act 2013, s. 13(1)(a)). 
154 SI 2002/2013.  This “hosting” shield only applies if upon obtaining knowledge of illegal activity or 
information, or even facts or circumstances from which such illegality is apparent, the provider “acts 
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information” (para. 19 (a) (ii)).  See also the related defences 
for mere conduit (para. 17) and caching (para. 18). 
155 Defamation Act 2013, s. 5(12). 
156 HC, Public Bill Committee, Defamation Bill Deb., 21 June 2012, col. 132 (Jonathan Djanogly MP, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State). 
157 Defamation Act 2013, s. 5(11). 
158 HL Deb., vol. 742, col. GC 195 (15 January 2013) (Lord Ahmed of Wimbledon, Government Whip). 
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statement complained of unless the court is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable for an action 
to be brought against the author, editor or publisher”.159 
Finally, the Act reforms the limitation period for claims brought in both defamation and 
malicious falsehood by introducing a ‘single publication rule”.  There has long been a special one year 
limitation period for launching such actions.160   However, this provision was almost entirely undercut 
by another rule under which a fresh publication is deemed to take place each time a statement is 
viewed, sold or otherwise republished.161  Especially when applied to the internet,162 this proved 
extremely onerous for publishers leading some to argue that “in effect, there [was] no limitation for 
libel”.163  The Act addresses the situation by providing that once a statement is published to the public 
at large,164 the limitation period will run from this time so long as, firstly, any subsequent statement is 
at least ‘substantially the same” 165 and, secondly, that the manner of subsequent publication is not 
“materially different”  from the first.166  Moreover, although the courts retain discretion to waive 
limitation periods in defamation where it would be “equitable” to do so,167 in practice it is “rare” for 
such limitation periods to be set aside.168   These new provisions, therefore, significantly restrict the 
right to a judicial remedy here.  
 
B. Data Protection Developments 
Unlike in defamation, there have been no significant legislative changes to UK data protection within 
the past few years.169   Nevertheless, there have been important developments both in the case law and 
159 Defamation Act 2013, s. 10. 
160 Limitation Act 1980, s. 4A. 
161 For the seminal statement of this rule see Duke of Brunswick v Harmer [1849] 14 Q.B. 185 (HC). 
162 As it was in Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Limited [2001] EWCA Civ 1805. 
163 Phillipson (note 118), 181.  
164 Or a ‘section of the public” (Defamation Act 2013, s. 8(2)). 
165 Defamation Act 2013, s. 8(1)(b). 
166 Defamation Act 2013, s. 8(4). 
167 Limitation Act 1980, s. 32A.  For a similar provision regarding personal injuries or death see Limitation Act 
1980, s. 33. 
168 Phillipson (note 118), 183.  
169 The last change in primary legislation was made in 2008 when provisions empowering the Information 
Commissioner to impose monetary penalties on data controllers were introduced.  See Data Protection Act 1998, 
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in the broader context which relate directly to the role of data protection in protecting reputation.   The 
case law will first be considered before briefly examining this broader context. 
 
Quinton v Peirce 
Although there has been a greater recent focus within domestic law on the interface between data 
protection and the right to reputation, not all of the cases have been supportive of a significant role for 
the DPA in this area.  In fact, Quinton v Peirce,170 the first case centrally concerned with this issue, 
took rather the opposite viewpoint.   This case concerned a local Conservative politician, Mr Quinton, 
who argued that certain misleading or even false (although not defamatory) statements had been 
included in his political opponent Mr Peirce’s election leaflets during a hard-fought local government 
election campaign in 2007.  Quinton not only claimed malicious falsehood but also breach of both the 
accuracy and fairness provisions of the DPA.     Eady J, who heard the case, considered that the DPA 
was applicable,171 that Mr Peirce was a “data controller”172 and that the exemptions for “journalism” 
were not relevant.173  In other respects, however, he reacted very unsympathetically to the data 
protection claim.  In sum, as regards the alleged violation of the accuracy standard, Eady stated that 
he could ‘see no reason to apply different criteria or standards in this respect from those I have 
applied when addressing the tort of injurious [malicious] falsehood”.174  As noted in section two, this 
little used tort requires proof of “malice”.  According to Tomlinson this makes the tort “a “non-
starter”…successful actions are vanishingly rare because the burden of proof is so high”.175  
Meanwhile, as regards the argument that the DPA fairness principle’s data subject notification 
provisions required that Quinton be informed of the leaflet in advance, Eady simply stated that he 
s. 55A as amended by Crime Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s. 144.  These provisions were brought fully 
into forced on 6 April 2010 as a result of The Data Protection (Monetary Penalties) Order, SI 2010/910. 
170 Quinton v Peirce [2009] EWHC 912 (QB), [2009] F.S.R. 17. 
171 ibid [59]. 
172 ibid [57]. 
173 ibid [4].  From the context it is clear that Eady was talking about the special provisions regulating processing 
for the purposes of journalism, artistic purposes and literary purposes as set out, in particular, in DPA, s. 32. 
174 ibid [92]. 
175 Phillipson (note 118), 186.  
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declined “to interpret the statute in a way which results in absurdity”.176   Eady was clearly frustrated 
by the “fine and arbitrary distinctions” which the DPA appeared to require, distinctions which to him 
illustrated the “confusion and uncertainty attending the application of these legislative provisions”.177 
 Overall, it may be argued that Quinton “is an illustration of what happens to a data protection 
claim to which an English court has reacted unsympathetically, particularly when it is brought before 
a court unfamiliar with data protection issues and concerned to fit them into a familiar pattern of well-
known torts, defamation and malicious falsehood”.178  Given the overriding need to interpret the 
legislation in line with the purpose of the Data Protection Directive,179 the court should really have 
addressed the completely different question of “whether the traditional torts are consistent and support 
the superior law derived from the European institutions”.180 Indeed, as Tugendhat J stated prior to his 
elevation to the bench: 
It is vital to note that the 1984 [Data Protection] Act created, and the 1998 Act continues, 
concepts entirely new to English law.   These rights do not depend on whether the data 
subject (as the person to whom information relates is called) would have rights under the 
existing law of confidentiality or defamation or any other tort or statute.181 
 
Clift v Slough Borough Council 
The other main English cases in this area have all centrally involved the participation of Tugendhat J 
who, as just mentioned, has long been on record as supporting a far more expansive interpretation of 
the data protection regime than that articulated by Eady.  The first such case, Clift v Slough Borough 
176 Quinton v Peirce, [93]. 
177 ibid, [68]. 
178 F. Aldhouse, “Political Opinions:  Injurious falsehood:  Quinton v. Peirce & Cooper” (2009) 6 Data 
Protection Law and Policy 7, 7 and 8.  
179 Österreichischer Rundfunk (note 106). 
180 Aldhouse (note 178), 8.  
181 M. Tugendhat “The Data Protection Act 1998 and the Media” (1999) Yearbook of Copyright and Media Law 
115, 120. 
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Council, was considered in both the High Court182 and the Court of Appeal.183  This defamation case 
concerned a Ms Jane Clift who was placed on Slough Borough Council’s Violent Persons Register as 
somebody posing a medium risk of violence.  This outcome arose from a reference Clift had made to 
the Council’s Anti-Social Behaviour Coordinator, Ms Rashid, regarding some criminal damage she 
had witnessed.  This was acrimoniously dealt with and led Clift to make a complaint to the Council 
during the course of which she repeatedly expressed a desire to inflict physical violence upon Rashid.  
Clift’s inclusion on the Register was circulated by the Council to a wide range of its employees and to 
four “partner organisations”.  Responding to Clift’s action, the Council accepted that the publication 
was defamatory but sought to rely on a defence of justification (truth) and qualified privilege.  Part of 
Clift’s response to the latter was to claim malice which would have prohibited the Council’s use of 
any privileged occasion.  In fact, the jury rejected both the Council’s defence of justification and 
Clift’s allegation of malice.184  The legal point of interest, which was considered at length by both 
Tugendhat in the High Court and Ward LJ in the Court of Appeal, concerns the scope of qualified 
privilege and, more particularly, the role of other legislation including potentially the DPA in 
constraining this. 
 The Council argued that following Kearns v General Council of the Bar [2003] EWCA Civ 
331 it could claim a defence of qualified privilege in relation to all its communications since, 
according to the Council, they were in each case made within an “established relationship…which 
required the flow of free and frank communication between them on all questions relevant to the 
discharge of the defendants” functions”.185   Nothing short of malice could defeat this.186   Clift in 
response argued that the defence could have no application where the communication was 
inconsistent with the duties of the Council to act compatibly with her European Convention right to 
182 Clift v Slough Borough Council [2009] EWHC 1550 (QB); [2010] E.M.L.R. 4. 
183 Clift v Slough Borough Council [2010] EWCA Civ 1171; [2011] 1 W.L.R. 1774. 
184 Clift v Slough Borough Council (HC) at [128]. 
185 Clift v Slough Borough Council (HC) at [55] (citing Kearns v General Council of the Bar at [53]). 
186 Clift v Slough Borough Council (HC) at [23].  However at [99] Tugendhat held that even if he had accepted 
such an  “established relationship” approach, he would have rejected its applicability in the case of publication 
to partnership organisations or non-employees since these entities were not in an established relationship with 
the Defendant.  
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reputation187 as required of public authorities by s. 6 HRA.  This was accepted by both the High Court 
and the Court of Appeal.  Furthermore, although the Council was found to have a legitimate aim in 
publishing the material, its publication of the statement to employees in the Council’s Licensing, Food 
and Safety and Children and Education Services as well as to Community Wardens, Trade Union 
Officials and anyone in the four partner organisations was found to be disproportionate and therefore 
in violation of Clift’s Convention rights.188 
Clift did not directly concern pleadings related to the DPA.189   Nevertheless, in the course of 
both the High Court and Court of Appeal judgments there were important dicta about the potential 
role of data protection in constraining the scope of qualified privilege especially vis-à-vis private 
actors (who are not directly covered by the HRA).  In particular, responding to the argument made in 
Kearns that when common law qualified privilege applied “[t]he need to act responsibly will not 
arise”,190 Tugendhat baldly stated “[i]n cases where the HRA or the DPA apply, that can no longer be 
said”.191   To the contrary 
[t]he DPA…requires attention to be focused on the rights of those who are the subject of 
references and warnings, as well as on the rights of those to whom the references and 
warnings are addressed.  Personal data must be processed (which includes disclosed) “fairly 
and lawfully”, and it must be accurate:  see Sch. 1.192 
This was important since “[w]hen incorrect information is communicated, carelessness or innocent 
error is more likely than malice to be the explanation”.193 
187 An aspect of her art. 8 right to respect for private life. 
188 Clift v Slough Borough Council (CA) at [38]. 
189 As detailed at [43] of Clift v Slough Borough Council (HC), Ms Clift had originally brought a claim under 
the DPA alleging that the Registrar acted in violation of the Act’s accuracy requirements.  Moreover, it appears 
that separate from the defamation proceedings she was continuing to pursue proceedings specific to the DPA (at 
[71]).  Tugendhat left open the possibility that she may have wider rights in relation to the DPA than were 
vindicated in her defamation action (at [88]). 
190 Kearns v General Council of the Bar at [45] cited in Clift v Slough Borough Council (HC) at [121]. 
191 Clift v Slough Borough Council (HC) at [122]. 
192 ibid at [120]. 
193 ibid at [118]. 
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In the Court of Appeal, Clift did rely in part on an argument that the narrow construction of 
qualified privilege favoured in the High Court was consistent with the Council’s duties under the 
DPA.194  Moreover, in addressing the proportionality point, Ward LJ stated: 
In my judgement it cannot be held to be disproportionate for a local authority to do what it is 
bound to do anyway whether in performance of its public law responsibilities, or its duty 
under the Data Protection Act 1998 or the Information Commissioner’s Data Protection Act 
1998 compliance advice used in the public sector, each of which is to all intents and purposes 
to the same effect.195 
It therefore seems that Tugendhat was right to make the, albeit rather understated, remark that “[t]he 
conclusions I have reached in this case may have some impact upon defences of qualified privileged 
[sic] raised by defendants who are not public authorities, but who have published information in 
breach of the DPA”.196 
 
Law Society v Kordowski 
The High Court case Law Society, Hine Solicitors & Kevin McGrath v Rick Kordowski, which did 
directly include a DPA claim brought against a private sector actor, concerned an action, brought on a 
representative basis, to injunct the Defendant from publishing the website ‘solicitors From Hell” and 
to restrain him from publishing any similar website in the future.197  Founded in 2005, this website 
comprised of a ““blacklist” of law firms and solicitors that should be avoided”198 collated from almost 
invariably anonymous postings made by disgruntled members of the public who were invited to 
““NAME and SHAME your OPPRESSOR”“.199  Action was brought in libel, harassment under the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and also breach of requirements to process data “fairly and 
194 Clift v Slough Borough Council (CA) at [19]. 
195 ibid at [35]. 
196 Clift v Slough Borough Council (HC) at [104]. 
197 Law Society, Hine Solicitors & Kevin McGrath v Rick Kordowski [2011] EWHC 3185 (QB) at [1]. 
198 ibid at [10]. 
199 ibid at [9].  It was also clear that, on occasion, the ability of the defendant to delete material from the website 
had “been used as a tool to demand money from those it names” (at [116]). 
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lawfully”, accurately and in accordance with data subjects’ rights under the DPA.  It was brought not 
only on behalf of the named claimants themselves but also of “all those currently featuring on the 
website and those who might, in the future, feature on the website”.200  The Law Society had 
previously sought to have their complaint resolved through enforcement action by the Information 
Commissioner. 
 As regards the specific statements complained of by the Second and Third Claimants, 
Tugendhat had little difficult finding them actionable in libel and in violation of both the Protection 
Against Harassment Act 1997 and the requirement under the DPA to “fairly and lawfully”  process 
personal data.201  He was therefore prepared to grant perpetual injunctions requiring their removal 
from the website and prohibiting publication on a similar website under all these causes of action.202  
Matters were not so straightforward in relation to the representative action, necessary to get the 
website removed in its entirety.  Tugendhat ruled that such action could be sustained under the DPA.  
This was because all the represented parties203 had a “common interest” arising from the defendant’s 
“course of conduct, which includes data processing, which is the same or similar in relation to all”.204  
Crucially, he also found that under the DPA “whilst the falsity or inaccuracy of the words (the course 
of conduct complained of) is not irrelevant… truth is not of itself a defence”.205  A perpetual 
injunction was therefore granted on this basis.206  In contrast, following the rule against interim 
injunctions set out in Bonnard207 no such relief could be granted in defamation.208  This was because 
despite their being a similar “common interest”, in this case “[w]hether publication of those words is, 
or will be, unlawful does not depend on the conduct of the Defendant.  It depends upon whether the 
200 ibid at [1]. 
201 ibid at [132]-[134].  Breach of the DPA’s accuracy provisions was not directly considered. 
202 Ibid at [139]-[142]. 
203 For completeness it should be noted that Tugendhat found that the Law Society itself did not itself have such 
a common interest.  He therefore held that the action for the Represented Claimants (i.e. the other solicitors) 
should be continued by the Second and Third Claimants rather than the Law Society as the Claimants 
themselves had proposed.  See ibid at [165]. 
204 ibid at [163]. 
205 ibid at [164]. 
206 ibid at [184]. 
207 Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269 (CA). 
208 It should be noted that Tugendhat did find it possible to grant a perpetual injunction under the Protection 
from Harassment Act 1997 (see ibid at [163]-[164]).  Consideration of this statute, however, is outside the scope 
of this article. 
29 
 
                                                          
words are true or false, or whether they can be defended under one or other established defences in 
libel”.209 
 A further notable feature of this case was that, during the course of his judgment, Tugendhat 
made some highly critical remarks about the approach the Information Commissioner had taken to the 
Law Society’s complaint.  In this context it should be noted that the Commissioner had written to the 
Law Society in early January 2011 in the following terms: 
The inclusion of the ʻdomestic purposesʼ exemption in the Data Protection Act (s. 36) is 
intended to balance individual’s rights to respect for his/her private life with the freedom of 
expression.  These rights are equally important and I am strongly of the view that it is not the 
purpose of the DPA to regulate an individual right to freedom of expression – even where the 
individual uses a third party website, rather than his own facilities, to exercise this … The 
situation would clearly be impossible were the Information Commissioner to be expected to 
rule on what it is acceptable for one individual to say about another be that a solicitor or 
another individual.210 
In contrast, Tugendhat stated that he did “not find it possible to reconcile the views on the law 
expressed in the Commissioner’s letter with authoritative statements of the law”, 211 that “[t]he DPA 
does envisage that the Information Commissioner should consider what it is acceptable for one 
individual to say about another” 212 and that he did “not understand how it could be said that s. 36 has 
any application to the present case” 213 
 
Google Spain 
209 Law Society v Kordowski at [166]. 
210 Quoted in Law Society v. Kordowski at [96]. 
211 ibid at [100]. 
212 ibid. 
213 ibid. 
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On 13 May 2014 the Grand Chamber of the CJEU handed down a path-breaking preliminary 
reference judgment, Google Spain, Google Inc. v.  Agencia Espaňola de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD), Mario Costeja González, a case which arose from Costeja’s demand that information 
originally published sixteen years previously related to ʻa real-estate auction connected with 
attachment proceedings for the recovery of social security debtsʼ214 be deindexed from Google search 
engines.  The Court found that even when mirroring in unaltered form material published live on the 
internet, search engines were not only data controllers215 but operated outside the special shield 
established for journalistic and allied purposes.216  As a result, the Court held that “[i]nasmuch as the 
activity of a search engine is … liable to affect significantly, and additionally compared with that of 
publishers of websites, the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data, the 
operator of the search engine … must ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, powers and 
capabilities, that the activity meets the requirement of Directive 95/46 in order that the guarantees laid 
down by the directive may have full effect and that effective and complete protection of data subjects, 
in particular of their right to privacy, may actually be achieved.”217  Not only its purpose, but also data 
protection’s substantive requirements were interpreted expansively.  In particular, the judgment 
stressed that (unless excused by specific derogations in national law justified under Article 13 of the 
Data Protection Directive) data controllers had to ensure that personal data are processing fairly and 
lawfully, that they are adequate, relevant and not excessive and that they are accurate.  It was 
particularly emphasised that “even initially lawful processing of accurate data may, in the course of 
time, become incompatible with the directive”,218 an understanding which may prove especially 
helpful to an individual wishing to get removed, or at least deindexed, statements especially of 
opinion rather than fact which are having an ongoing negative impact on their reputation.   It was 
stressed that not only was it not necessary for the data subject to prove that the processing “causes 
prejudice” but that, in light inter alia of the fundamental right to data protection set out in the EU 
Charter, “those rights override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the search 
214 ibid at [98]. 
215 Google Spain at [33]. 
216 ibid at [85]. 
217 ibid at [38]. 
218 ibid at [93]. 
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engine but also the interest of the general public in finding that information upon a search relating to 
the data subject’s name”.219   Finally, as regards the concrete claim at issue, the court found that 
Costeja had established ʻa right that the information should no longer be linked to his name by means 
of such a listʼ.220 
 
Broader context 
This burgeoning data protection case law has been mirrored by broader developments which have also 
indicated the potential for a much greater role for the DPA in the area of reputation rights in the 
future.  Firstly, in December 2010, the extent of the European Commission’s infringement 
proceedings against the UK’s potentially incorrect transposition of the Data Protection Directive 
finally came to light.  These proceedings, which began as far back as 2004, alleged, in particular, that 
the DPA’s “domestic purposes” exemption was phrased too broadly, that the Act incorrectly granted 
courts a discretion in relation to the updating, rectification, erasure or blocking of personal data, that it 
incorrectly limited rights to compensation in relation to non-material damage and that the 
Commissioner appeared to have been granted inadequate investigative powers.221  Even if this action 
is not finally pursued before the CJEU, both the depth and breadth of these concerns suggests that UK 
courts may have wide-ranging obligations to expansively interpret the DPA in order to ensure, as far 
as possible, that proper effect is given to the Directive which it is meant to implement. 
 Secondly, in late 2012, Lord Leveson published his report on press regulation, produced as a 
result of an inquiry commissioned by the Government in July 2011.   The report gave prominence to 
data protection, expressing criticism both of the current legislation and of the timid approach taken to 
it by legal practitioners, the higher courts222 and most particularly the Information Commissioner 
himself.223  The Leveson Report also specifically cited the Kordowski case considered above, arguing 
219 ibid at [97]. 
220 ibid at [98]. 
221 Jay (note 63), 20.  
222 B. Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, 999. 
223 ibid, 1061. 
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that it also “took a wider view of the ICO’s functions in relation to journalism than it was minded to 
take itself”.224  For the future, Leveson proposed significant reform of both the Information 
Commissioner’s approach and the legislative framework.  Regarding the former, Leveson 
recommended that the ICO take immediate steps “to prepare, adopt and publish a policy on the 
exercise of its formal regulatory functions in order to ensure that the press comply with the legal 
requirements of the data protection regime”,225 that it likewise “prepare and issue comprehensive 
good practice guidelines and advice on appropriate principles and standards to be observed by the 
press in the processing of personal data” 226 and finally that it “publish advice aimed at individuals 
(data subjects) concerned that their data have or may have been processed by the press unlawfully or 
otherwise than in accordance with good practice”.227   Meanwhile, as regards the DPA itself, Leveson 
recommended that the exemptions provided for the purposes of journalism, artistic purposes and 
literary purposes be significantly narrowed including in particular removing all of the special 
limitations on the requirement to ensure the accuracy of personal data.228  He further recommended 
that it be made clear that compensation under the DPA be generally available for pure distress229 and 
that the procedural restrictions on the courts issuing injunctions and the Commissioner using his 
enforcement powers in relation to the purposes of journalism, artistic purposes and literary purposes 
224 ibid, 1107.  It should be noted that in Kordowski actually rejected the proposition that the website Solicitors 
From Hell could benefit from the DPA’s special protections for processing for the purposes of journalism, 
artistic purposes and literary purposes (s. 32).  Whilst acknowledging that “[t]oday anyone with access to the 
internet can engage in journalism at no cost”, it also found that the “[j]ournalism that is protected by s. 32 
involves communication of information or ideas to the public at large in the public interest” (at [99]).  It is 
certainly true that the DPA requires that the data controller has a reasonable belief that publication is the public 
interest to benefit from s. 32’s substantive protections (s. 32(1)-(2)).  This requirement was clearly not met in 
this case.  As regards the procedural protection from injunctive relief, however, s. 32 only expressly requires 
that the data controller claims or it appears to the court that processing is only for the purposes of journalism, 
artistic purposes and/or literary purposes and with a view to the publication of material not previously published 
by the data controller twenty-four hours previously (s. 32 (4)-(6)).  It seems, therefore, that Tugendhat implied 
into the DPA’s definition of the purposes of journalism, artistic purposes and literary purposes some kind of 
public interest threshold. 
225 ibid, 1811. 
226 ibid, 1811. 
227 ibid, 1812. 
228 ibid, 1810. 
229 ibid, 1810. 
33 
 
                                                          
be repealed.230  Finally, Leveson proposed that the judiciary’s Civil Justice Council review the level 
of damages generally available for breach of data protection.231 
 Although the Government initially committed to consulting on the Leveson’s 
recommendations for legislative reform,232 this has not been forthcoming and it seems unlikely that 
significant statutory change will ultimately eventuate.  In contrast, following both the Kordowski 
judgment and the Leveson Report, the ICO has been engaging in a process of reanalysis of its stance 
vis-à-vis free speech issues.  Related principally to the former, in May 2013 the Office published new 
guidance on social networking and online forums.233  In stark conflict with the CJEU’s holding in the 
Lindqvist case (see above), this guidance maintained the Office’s former position that as a result of the 
DPA’s “domestic purposes” exemption, individuals “who have posted personal data whilst acting in a 
personal capacity” would not themselves need to comply with the DPA’s data protection principles in 
any case.234  On the other hand, the Guidance also held that, additionally to any responsibilities they 
had under inter alia defamation law,235 social networking and online forums were themselves data 
controllers subject to the DPA including in relation to information posted by either individual or 
corporate third parties.236  Such websites therefore had a duty to take “reasonable steps to check the 
accuracy of any personal data that is posted.”237 Even in relation to forums where the vast majority of 
230 ibid, 1810. 
231 ibid, 1813. 
232 Letter from Rt Hon Chris Grayling, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, to the Chair of the 
House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee, 22 September 2013 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmhaff/524/524we29.htm > accessed 20 August 
2014. 
233 Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘social networking and online forums – when does the DPA apply?” 
<ico.org.uk/for_organisations/guidance_index/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Detailed_specialist_
guides/social-networking-and-online-forums-dpa-guidance.ashx> 
accessed 9 April 2014. 
234 ibid, 15.  At other times, however, the Office has acknowledged the validity of the CJEU’s Lindqvist ruling 
(also confirmed in Satamedia).  For example, giving evidence to the House of Commons’ Justice Committee on 
4 September 2013, the current Information Commissioner Christopher Graham stated:  “There is European case 
law that says – in a nutshell – that open online publication means the processing of personal data done in 
connection with this falls outside data protection laws ʻdomestic purposesʼ exemption.”  House of Commons, 
Justice Committee, The Committee’s Opinion on the European Union Data Protection framework proposals 
Volume I (London, 2010), Ev 57. 
235 Information Commissioner’s Office (note 233), 16. 
236 The rationale offered by the guidance was as follows:  “If the site only allows posts subject to terms and 
conditions which cover acceptable content, and if it can remove posts which breach its policies on such matters, 
then it will still, to some extent, be determining the purposes and manner in which personal data is processing.  
It will therefore be a data controller.” Information Commissioner’s Office (note 233), 11. 
237 Information Commissioner’s Office (note 233), 12. 
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site content is posted by third parties, the volume third party posts is significant and the site is not pre-
moderated, the guidance suggested that “reasonable steps” would include having clear and prominent 
policies for users about acceptable and non-acceptable posts, having clear and easy to find procedures 
in place for data subjects to dispute the accuracy of posts and ask them to be removed and responding 
to disputes quickly and having procedures to remove or suspend access to content, at least until such 
time as a dispute has been settled.238  Finally, as regards non-factual posts, the guidance added that 
policies must also be in place that are sufficient to deal with “complaints from people who believe that 
their personal data may have been processed unfairly or unlawfully because they have been the 
subject of derogatory, threatening or abusive online postings by third parties”.239  This broad 
understanding of the scope of the data controller responsibility vis-à-vis corporate online actors who 
play an active role in the facilitation of information dissemination originating from others has clearly 
also been vindicated in Google Spain, a judgment which the Office also welcomed.240 
 Meanwhile, in January 2014 the ICO published its draft guidelines on data protection vis-à-
vis the media.241  Although acknowledging that the s. 32 provision for the purposes of journalism, 
artistic purposes and literary purposes was “one of the broadest exemptions”,242 the draft guidance 
also stressed that to benefit from s. 32’s substantive protections the data controller must prove a 
reasonable belief as to both the public interest of publication and also as to the incompatibility of 
238 Information Commissioner’s Office (note 233), 13-14.  Seemingly as an alternative to the stipulation to 
remove material, the guidance states that the site “might wish to set up a mechanism which allows it to add a 
note to a post indicating that a data subject disputes its factual accuracy”.  The ICO’s position nevertheless 
remains that “it will be probably be more practical for the site to simply remove or suspend access to the dispute 
post in this type of situation” (14).  In any case, following the interpretation of “reasonable care” established in 
relation to the Defamation Act 1996 in Godfrey v Demon Internet, it would appear that if the data subject 
presented clear evidence that the information processed was in fact inaccurate, the data controller would not 
have taken “reasonable steps” unless any note made clear that this was indeed the case. 
239 ibid, 14. 
240 Information Commissioner’s Office, ICO response to the European Union Court of Justice ruling on online 
search results < http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2014/ico-response-to-european-union-court-of-justice-
ruling-14052014> accessed 19 August 2014. 
241 Information Commissioner’s Office, Data Protection and journalism:  a guide for the media (draft for 
consultation) <ico.org.uk/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Research_and_reports/data-protection-
and-journalism-a-guide-for-the-media-draft.pdf> accessed 9 April 2014. 
242 ibid, 21. 
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compliance with general data protection principles.243  Most significantly, these requirements were 
interpreted strictly vis-à-vis accuracy: 
The DPA requires you to record details correctly and take reasonable steps to check your facts.  
You should also clearly distinguish between fact and opinion, and if the individual disputes the 
facts you should say so. … We would not expect you to fall back on the [s. 32] exemption very 
often, as it is hard to argue it is in the public interest to publish inaccurate stories without making 
reasonable checks.244 
 
IV. A DEVELOPING ROLE FOR DATA PROTECTION? 
Over the past few years, a number of lawyers have increasingly vocalised concerns over whether 
defamation law provides sufficient protection for an individual’s right to reputation in all 
circumstances.  It has even been suggested that English defamation law may fail to fully vindicate the 
floor of reputation rights incorporated within Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.  
Such concerns, which partly arise from the weakening of this law as a result of jurisprudential 
developments, will become more acute under the Defamation Act 2013.   These developments, 
therefore, raise anew the question of whether data protection law can fill at least some of these 
potential protection “gaps” in the future. 
 
A. Perceived Gaps in Protection 
It is possible to locate a range of substantive and procedural limitations under the reformed law of 
defamation which are likely to prove irksome to a potential claimant.  The key limitations, most of 
which were discussed in detail in the previous two sections, may be briefly summarised as follows.  
At a substantive level, defamation law will now provide no redress for publication of even a 
243 ibid, 23. 
244 ibid, 38. 
36 
 
                                                          
manifestly inaccurate statement unless this “has caused or is likely to cause serious harm”245 to the 
standing of applicant vis-à-vis “members of society generally”.246  Defamation also includes an 
expanding range of defences, particularly as regards communication on a privileged occasion, which 
will generally defeat any action.  Moreover, in relation to factual statements, in those cases where 
defamation law provides for a full defence other than truth, it does not even provide for partial redress 
in the form of a declaration of falsity.  This limitation has become more serious since Reynolds 
provided for a broad defence for publication to the world which was not dependent on the accuracy of 
the statements made.  Thus, a “wrongly libelled reputation” may be “left besmirched” under current 
defamation law.247  In addition, the Act’s new defence of “honest opinion” will allow for the broad 
publication of defamatory comment about purely private persons without any need for show a “public 
interest”.248  The breadth of the Act’s new defence for website operators is of greatest concern.249  
This will leave claimants powerless to hold a wide range of online actors responsible under 
defamation law not only when they release the name and address of the original poster but even in 
cases where the claimant must obtain, undoubtedly at considerable expense, a court order to secure 
such details and, most worryingly, even when these details later turn out to be inaccurate and perhaps 
useless.250   
Turning to the procedural aspects, Bonnard251 already largely rules out the granting of interim 
relief in defamation.  Tomlinson contends that 
this rule proceeds on the basis that the claimant’s right to reputation is always over-ridden at 
the interim stage by the defendant’s right to freedom of expression.  It is difficult to see how 
245 Defamation Act 2013, s. 1. 
246 Sim v Stretch. 
247 A. Mullis & A. Scott, “Tilting at Windmills:  the Defamation Act 2013”, Modern Law Review (2014), 107. 
248 Defamation Act 2013, s. 3.  
249 Defamation Act 2013, s. 5. 
250 Either because the Defendant cannot in fact be traced or is impecunious or is out of jurisdiction. 
251 Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269 (CA). 
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this can be consistent with the requirement to balance the rights under Article 8 [to reputation] 
and Article 10 [to freedom of expression] on the facts of each case.252 
The law also includes a special provision requiring that claims in defamation be brought within the 
“relatively short window” 253 of one-year.254 Although historically the effect of this provision was 
curtailed by rules allowing the founding of an action based on any re-publication of a statement, the 
Defamation Act 2013’s introduction of a ‘single-publication rule” in many contexts ensures that this 
restriction will bite in a much wider range of cases.  Finally, actions in defamation can be notoriously 
expensive, a fact which will increasingly trouble claimants if and when the reforms of Conditional 
Free Arrangements (CFAs) are commenced in relation to such actions.255 
 
B. Can Data Protection Fill the Gaps? 
At a purely conceptual level, it is possible to envisage data protection filling many of the gaps 
elucidated above.  Turning to the substantive issues first, any inaccuracy, even if it alleges a state of 
affairs which would encounter no opprobrium within majority society, can in principle found an 
action under the DPA.  There is also no over-arching requirement to demonstrate that ‘serious harm” 
has resulted.  Moreover, the courts” right, which applies even when inaccurate personal data has 
already been “rectified, blocked, erased or destroyed”, to order the data controller “to notify third 
parties to whom the data have been disclosed”256 of this inaccuracy, means that the DPA does provide 
for the possibility of a declaration of falsity.  Thirdly, as signalled in Clift, the making of a statement 
of an occasion of qualified privilege does not absolve a data controller from compliance with the data 
252 H. Tomlinson, Revisited and Updated:  Strasbourg on Privacy and Regulation Part 3:  A balance between 
reputation and expression? (Inforrm’s Blog 23 June 2010) <http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2010/06/23/revisited-
and-updated-strasbourg-on-privacy-and-reputation-part-3-%E2%80%9Ca-balance-between-reputation-and-
expression%E2%80%9D/> accessed 17 April 2013. 
253 A. Hurst and J. Gilbert “Using DP Act to protect reputation” (2013) 66 Privacy Laws & Business United 
Kingdom Newsletter 16, 16 and 18. 
254 Limitation Act 1980, s. 4A. 
255 For full details see note 33. 
256 DPA, s. 13(3).  The court must consider such an understanding “reasonably practicable”. 
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protection principles, including the duty to process data “fairly”.257  Such requirements may limit the 
scope of this privilege in defamation as well as founding a separate action under the DPA itself.258  
Regarding the latter, the DPA may also provide redress in cases where an opinion, as opposed to a 
fact, about a purely private person is widely published in a way which clearly will have a 
disproportionate and, therefore, unfair effect on that individual.259  Court judgments such as 
Kordowski and Google Spain as well as recent guidance from the ICO also highlight that many 
website operators will have data controller responsibilities under the DPA as a result of playing an 
active role in facilitating the dissemination of information originally posted by third parties.  These 
responsibilities apply irrespective of whether they benefit from the new defence included within the 
Defamation Act 2013. 
The DPA’s potential procedural flexibility should also be noted.  Firstly, as the Kordowski 
case vividly illustrated, interim and other injunctive relief is available here in a much broader range of 
situations than in defamation.  Indeed, in marked contrast to the approach taken in Bonnard, data 
protection is premised on the belief that 
in many circumstances it will be of the utmost importance that a defendant is prohibited as 
soon as possible from continuing to process data in a way that is inconsistent with the DP Act.  
Employing such a remedy in a defamation context can therefore provide a claimant with the 
powerful remedy that would not be available under traditional libel proceedings.260 
Secondly, not only does action brought under the DPA benefit from the general six-year limitation 
period in tort261 but, due to the broad meaning of the term “processing”, it encapsulates as Google 
Spain again highlighted a mirror of the old “multiple publication rule” in defamation.  Finally, turning 
to the legal cost issue, in the case of data protection there is an alternative to court action in the form 
257 Clift v Slough Borough Council (HC) [120]. 
258 ibid [70]. 
259 As previously noted, given removal of the “public interest” requirement from the “honest opinion” defence in 
the new Defamation Act 2013 (s. 3), it seems clear that defamation law will no longer provide any redress in 
these cases.  The possibility of the DPA stepping into the breach as a result has already been briefly mooted by 
Phillipson (note 118), 178. 
260 Hurst and Gilbert (note 253), 18. 
261 Limitation Act 1980, s. 2. 
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of making a cost-free complaint to the Information Commissioner requesting that he deploy his 
extensive regulatory enforcement powers to provide redress.262 
 
C. The Broader Context 
Notwithstanding the clear potential outlined above, it is also necessary to take into account a broader 
context filled with a range of obstacles placed in the way of any claimant seeking to use data 
protection to vindicate reputation.  Firstly, as outlined in section two, the DPA is replete with 
limitations and exemptions.  Although these are almost always significantly qualified, they are wide-
ranging.  One important example is the special provision for the purposes of journalism, artistic 
purposes and literary purposes found in s. 32.  This reality is reflective of the fact that the Act was 
generally designed to “implement the [Data Protection] Directive in the least burdensome way for 
data users”.263  As a result, there remain major uncertainties as regards when a court will actually find 
a violation of the Act, when and according to what metric compensation should be awarded and, 
finally, in what circumstances a non-financial remedy such as rectification of data is available.  
Although the legitimacy of many of these restrictions under EU law may be questioned, the effect of 
them on the domestic claimant is nevertheless very real.  Secondly, again as noted previously, at least 
until recently, the English courts have generally adopted a narrow and even hostile interpretation of 
the DPA and even the Information Commissioner has also historically proved reluctant to support the 
deployment of the DPA in this area.  Nevertheless, whilst the full extent of any shift remain unclear, 
in the wake of Kordowski, the Leveson Report and Google Spain there are signs that that data 
protection is being taken more seriously in this area, including by the Commissioner himself. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
262 DPA s. 42.  Moreover, although his powers are somewhat circumscribed where the processing in question is 
solely journalistic, literary or artistic, in these cases the Commissioner can also be required to consider 
providing assistance to the claimant in DPA civil proceedings against the relevant data controller.  See DPA, s. 
53. 
263 Home Office Consultation Paper on the EC Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) (London 1996), 5. 
40 
 
                                                          
Traditionally, defamation law has occupied a position of overwhelming dominance in the legal 
framework for vindicating the right to reputation.  Nevertheless, the past decade has seen a 
liberalisation of this body of law, a development which is substantially extended by the Defamation 
Act 2013.  This has led a number of legal commentators to argue that English defamation law may fail 
to adequately protect the right to reputation even as instantiated in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
 Historically, the potential for UK data protection law to safeguard the reputation of natural 
persons has been largely overlooked.  This reflects not only of the minimalist transposition of the EU 
Data Protection Directive made by the DPA but also the constrained interpretation adopted of it by 
both the courts and the Information Commissioner.  Nevertheless, concerns that the rights to 
reputation of natural claimants may not be being adequately protected have led to pressure on data 
protection to fill the relevant gaps.  There are now signs in both the case law and in broader policy 
thinking that such pressure is beginning to bear fruit. 
Data protection certainly offers the natural person claimant a number of tantalizing potential 
advantages including general applicability as regards its material scope and breadth as regards its 
substantive standards as related to both accuracy and fairness.  Moreover, even if a website operator 
benefits from the new liability shield under the Defamation Act 2013 vis-à-vis content originally 
posted by a third party, this will in no way absolve them from having responsibilities under data 
protection if they are playing an active role in facilitating the dissemination of this information.  
Finally, there is the potential remedial flexibility of data protection including through the granting of 
injunctive relief as demonstrated in Kordowski.  It seems therefore clear that claimants will 
increasingly seek to use DPA to vindicate their reputation in proceedings before both the courts and 
the Information Commissioner.  Despite this, the legislative and other obstacles placed in the way of 
their success remain formidable.  Consequently, although data protection will undoubtedly assume 
significantly greater importance in this area in the future, both the extent and precise modalities of this 
change remain more uncertain. 
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